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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: Melvin Higgips Esq. 
195 Wall Street 
Kingston, New York 12401 
Decision appealed: July 2017 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months. 
Board Member(s) J. Smith, Cruse, Ludlow 
' . 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received December 17, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ __ _ 
~med _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
~d _Vacated, remanded· for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the sep te ndings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the hunate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on /.'J · 
Distribution: Appeals Unit-Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(a) (1112018) 
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     Appellant challenges the July 2017 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 24-month hold. Appellant’s instant offense involved him raping and murdering a seven year old 
girl. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the decision is irrational bordering on impropriety in 
that the Board failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 2) the 
decision is the same as prior decisions. 3) the decision lacks future guidance. 4) the Board failed 
to make factual findings in support of the standards cited. 5) the decision violated the due process 
clause of the constitution. 6) the Board did not have his sentencing minutes. 7) the Board was 
hostile. 8) the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law in that the 
COMPAS was ignored, and the statutes are now forward based. 
 
     Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
 
     Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime (murder), the Board 
considered other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor 
considered.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 
(3d Dept. 2016); Matter of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d 
Dept. 2018); Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 
1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017). 
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     Although the Board placed particular emphasis upon the fact the offense involved a vulnerable 
victim, it was not required to discuss or give equal weight to every factor it considered in denying 
petitioner’s request” - Matter of Yourdon v. New York State Div. of Parole, 32 A.D.3d 1065, 1066, 
820 N.Y.S.2d 366, 367 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 801, 828 N.Y.S.2d 292 (2007). 
 
    The Board may take note of the inmate’s disregard for the life of another human being. Hakim v 
Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept 2003); Angel v Travis, 1 A.D.3d 589, 767 
N.Y.S.2d 290 (3d Dept 2003). 
      “[T]here is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given effect by 
considering  insight.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000).  
Insight is relevant not only to rehabilitative progress but also to whether release would deprecate 
the severity of the offense.  Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 23, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 
125 (1st Dept. 2007). 
    The Board may consider inadequate release plans in denying parole.  See, e.g., Matter of 
Delrosario v. Stanford, 140 A.D.3d 1515, 34 N.Y.S.3d 696 (3d Dept. 2016) (concern about reentry 
plans in case immigration does not deport inmate); Matter of Murphy v. State of New York Exec. 
Dep’t Div. of Parole Appeals Unit, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 32825(U), 2010 N.Y. Misc. Lexis 4926 
(Sup. Ct. Albany Co. Sept. 30, 2010) (Ceresia S.C.J.) (denial based in part on absence of legitimate 
release plan). 
    That the Board “did not recite the precise statutory language of Executive Law § 259-i (2)(c)(A) 
in support of its conclusion to deny parole does not undermine its conclusion.”  Matter of Mullins 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016) 
(citation omitted); accord Matter of Reed v. Evans, 94 A.D.3d 1323, 942 N.Y.S.2d 387 (3d Dept. 
2012).  The language used by the Board was “only semantically different” from the statute.  Matter 
of Miller v. New York State Div. of Parole, 72 A.D.3d 690, 691–92, 897 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727 (2d 
Dept. 2010); Matter of James v. Chairman of New York State Div. of Parole, 19 A.D.3d 857, 858, 
796 N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (3d Dept. 2005); see also People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983) (upholding decision that denied release 
as “contrary to the best interest of the community”).   
   As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
     As for an alleged similarity to prior Board decisions, since the Board is required to consider the 
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same statutory factors each time an inmate appears before it, it follows that the same aspects of the 
individual’s record may again constitute the primary grounds for a denial of parole.  Matter of 
Hakim v. Travis, 302 A.D.2d 821, 754 N.Y.S.2d 600 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Bridget v. Travis, 
300 A.D.2d 776, 750 N.Y.S.2d 795 (3d Dept. 2002).  The Board is required to consider the same 
factors each time he appears in front of them.  Matter of Williams v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143 (2010). 
 
     An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest in 
parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter 
of Motti v. Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 114, 115, 863 N.Y.S.2d 839, 839-40 (3d Dept. 2008); Matter of 
Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (3d Dept. 
2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). 
     Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
   The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was affected by a 
showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 
N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
         In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
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A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
   There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-
finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 
2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 
957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal 
policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 
(2000).  There must be support in the record to prove an alleged bias and proof that the decision 
flowed from such bias.  Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706 N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d 
Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017) (rejecting bias claim); Matter of 
Grune v. Board of Parole,41 A.D.3d 1014, 838 N.Y.S.2d 694 (3d Dept. 2007).  Appellant has 
failed to overcome the presumption that the Board complied with its duty.  See Matter of Davis v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 (2d Dept. 1985). 
 
    Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 amendments and 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) as amended do 
not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for 
release decisions.  This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  In 
2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 
985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never 
intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information 
from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 
amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of 
each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amendments 
also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  
Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the 
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statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017). 
 
   The sentencing court has sent an affidavit stating the sentencing minutes are permanently 
unavailable. A letter from the Court indicating the sentencing minutes cannot be located is sufficient 
to prove unavailability of the minutes, and that no new interview is mandated. LaSalle v New York 
State Division of Parole, 69 A.D.3d 1252, 893 N.Y.S.2d 706 (3d Dept. 2010)  lv.den. 14 N.Y.2d 
709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 142; Midgette v New York State Division of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1039, 895 
N.Y.S.2d 530 (2d Dept. 2010); Andreo v Alexander, 72 A.D.2d 1178, 898 N.Y.S.2d 690 (3d Dept. 
2010);  Williams v New York State Division of Parole, 70 A.D.3d 1106, 894 N.Y.S.2d 224 (3d Dept. 
2010) lv.den. 14 N.Y.3d 709, 901 N.Y.S.2d 143.      
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
